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92 required that as the application under O. Where a conscious, deliberate decision by a government department is taken on the distribution of finite resources, the need for restraint on the part of a reviewing Top Property Lawyers Chandigarh High Court is both obvious and principled. No such assessment was carried out in relation to the father. Of course, after the appellant's challenge materialised, the department addressed possible advantages that might accrue if the nomination requirement was maintained and, as I have said, these are not to be dismissed solely because they are the product of hindsight - nor even because they have been put forward post hoc as a possible justification for discrimination in reaction to the appellant's claim.

Section 148 of the Code Civil Procedure would not apply 702 in these circumstances, and the executing High Court Property Advocates was right in holding that it could not extend time. But where the question of the impact of a particular measure on social and economic matters has not been addressed by the government department responsible for a particular policy choice, the imperative for reticence on the part of a court tasked with the duty of reviewing the decision is diminished.

It was also agreed that a parenting capacity assessment was carried out in relation to the mother. The Lord Ordinary was provided with a copy of the assessment report. Nothing in the Northern Ireland Act bears on the question whether the giving of notification under article 50 can be effected under the prerogative or requires authorisation by an Act of Parliament. Nor does a political convention, such as the Sewel Convention plainly is in its application to Northern Ireland, give rise to a legally enforceable obligation.

More specifically, neither section 1 nor section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act has any relevance in the present context. But the level of scrutiny of the validity of the claims must intensify to take account of the fact that the claims are made ex post facto and the claimed immunity from review on account of the decision falling within the socio-economic sphere must be more critically examined. 92, there being no question of the application of O. We are of the view that in the circumstances it was not open to the executing court to extend time without consent of parties for time between October 7, 1958 to November 21, 1958 was granted by consent of parties.

Property Advocates in High Court Chandigarh relation to these, section 84(1), read with section 84(2), enables the Chandigarh High Court Property Lawyers to make a permanence order without the consent of the child where the child is aged under 12, as was the position in this case. 5, for the money had not been deposited on November 22, 1958 before the order of confirmation confirmed was passed. 92 in its order, but it is obvious that the executing court held that it could not grant time in the absence of an agreement between the parties, because O.

Decisions on social and economic policy are par excellence the stuff of government. Given my disagreement with the decision of the majority of the court as to the necessity for an Act of Parliament before article 50 can be invoked, it follows that I would also have dealt with the devolution issues raised in the Northern Irish cases differently. So far as those cases raise issues Property Advocate in High Court Chandigarh which are distinct from those arising in the Miller appeal, however, I agree with the way in which the majority have dealt with them.

Thereafter it rightly the sale as required under O. I agree with the Divisional Court’s Property Advocates in Chandigarh reasoning in the passage which I have cited, and in particular with the final sentence: even apart from the inference which might be drawn from examples of express provisions restricting the exercise of prerogative powers in relation to EU law, there is in any event insufficient ground to hold that Parliament has by implication curtailed or fettered the Crown’s prerogative powers in relation to the Treaties.

In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the order of the executing court refusing grant of time and confirming the sale was correct. In this case, DENI was not concerned about socio-economic choices when it decided to mimic the nomination requirement that was in place in England and Wales. The Lord Ordinary’s opinion does not explain why that was. The executing court has not referred to O. Section 84 sets out the conditions and considerations applicable to the making of a permanence order.

90 had been dismissed, the sale must be confirmed. The Court of Appeal in para 19 of its judgment (perhaps in contrast to its later statement in para 47 - see para 41 above) acknowledged that these powers were available to PSNI but considered that the incomplete enactment of the North report created a particular difficulty for the police: The Lord Ordinary also narrates that he was provided with a copy of a report prepared by a Dr Coupar, but the opinion contains no indication of the subject-matter of the report.

and (ii) under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, an independent right of adoption is given to Hindu female and if a widow adopts a son, he becomes the adopted son of the widow only and was not deemed to be the son of her deceased husband. It was motivated solely by the desire to maintain consistency between the two schemes.